Yinger states that it is plain to see the universality of religion, though it has a wide variety in forms of expression. While societies were in relatively infrequent contact with each other the facts of universality and variety were insignificant, but when contact became extensive, with mobility and change creating situations of religious diversity within societies, these facts became more important. Though religions share many things in common, their values and effects can be differentiated, and informed value choices are still needed. The sociologist and the scientific study of religion makes certain assumptions that the methods of objective science can be applied to religious phenomenon and that religion, when it is being examined within the framework of science, is dealt with as a part of the natural world, subject to the laws of cause and effect and the rules of logic. Yinger believes his tentative efforts to state how religion and society interact under certain conditions are valuable not only to other sciences, but to the religious quest itself. The intricate ways in which religion is involved in the life of society are revealed by exploring religious movements in their social settings. Yinger's interpretive essays explore some of the religious consequences of the growth of cities, of minority status, of the decline of ethnic groups, of prosperity, and of rapid social change. He looks at religion from the perspectives of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology seeing it as one of the processes of social life while recognizing the limitations of these views.

The sociologist begins with the basic proposition that religion cannot be understood in isolation from the rest of society. Religion is part of a system, interacting with the economic and political aspects of society, the family patterns, the technology, and the nature of the communities. If one part of a system changes, the other parts are influenced in various ways. Yinger proposes that if literacy, mobility, and science develop in a community, its religions will undergo important changes, not just superficially, but fundamentally. If a new religion moves into a society, the whole social structure feels the impact, while at the same time modifying the religion it absorbs.

Every society has some pattern of belief and action by means of which it performs certain vital functions; in essence every society has a religion, even if it is an anti-religion. The ultimate question of many religions is how man spends eternal life, but Yinger claims that most people today are more likely to ask of their religion that it helps them to understand the suffering, loneliness, and meaninglessness of life. He says that religion can be defined as a group-supported road to salvation, but asks salvation from what?

Yinger claims the major religions of the world developed in rural settings, and says even today religion is tied to rural societies. The growth of cities with the development of urbanization has posed new problems for religious institutions as well as for political, economic, and familial institutions. Urban societies create a situation for the first time in human history where individuals interact daily with strangers whose values and goals are different from their own. Literacy and mobility expand horizons of contact, and with contact, disenchantment and secularization come into play. In the urban setting, kinship units lose some solidarity and functions, but despite this loss, the family remains a vital part of urban life. These urban societies are characterized by increased normlessness, witnessing a reduction in the value consensus of the majority of people who have been influenced by mass media and mass production. Although agreement on norms and values decrease, functional interdependence and tolerance tend to increase. The profound changes in the nature of life in urban societies, Yinger says, has enormous consequences for religion. Most of the religious movements in cities reflect the efforts of various groups to come to terms with urban life, while searching for some stability in this ever-changing setting. The revival of interest in religion is a manifestation of these conflicts and anxieties of contemporary life.

Religion is believed to be good for society in that it softens some of the harsher consequences of the pursuit of secular values and that it makes it easier for diverse groups to live with one another without sharp conflict, emphasizing a common humanity. In the search for some ultimate meaning to existence, some system of beliefs that lends dignity to life and makes suffering less severe, few are likely to be persuaded by a religion that disregards the conflicts and the institutions that make life harsh and meaningless to many. With the central areas of most of our metropolitan districts deteriorating, the consequences are well recognized. Physical decay is followed by disease, delinquency, crime, racial conflict, political corruption, and value confusion, while gangs, narcotics, or alcohol might be used in a desperate effort to find a sense of well-being in the midst of a society that crushes the sense of self-worth. These religious substitutes derive from the botched efforts of conquered individuals to find a road to salvation. If established churches pass them by, moving out to the suburbs and resisting those lower in status, and often different in race or ethnic group, then they will inevitably accept these substitutions. Just when the stabilizing efforts of the churches are needed, its members tend to look for more comfortable circumstances, turning their back on the harshness of the inner-city and its inhabitants. .

In functional analysis, emphasis is placed on both the possible contribution of religion to society and its contribution to individuals, in lending dignity and significance to their lives, even in the face of crushing difficulties. It is not enough today for religion to give vitality and support to a shared system of values, but it must also negotiate among groups who have different values in an effort to maintain in them a sense of common humanity. Modern societies are held together by political and functional interdependence despite the lack of kinship identity and in the face of cultural differences. Urban man has responded by inventing religious tolerance, though it is safe to say we are never tolerant about our basic values. Yinger believes that if there is a return to religion, it is to an organization that makes few creedal demands and rouses in us few fundamental values, but many people continue to use religion as the final judge of life's values, and are likely to be intolerant when basic issues arise. Some kind of religious conflict is likely in a complex society consisting of a variety of religious traditions. We tend to minimize these problems by counting them as the inevitable fruits of religious freedom. In a period of such repeated crises as we have known, renewed attention to man's capacity for evil comes into the Theologian's mind, while sociologists try to relate their work to the whole series of forces that influence man in modern society. Theological approaches are highly abstract, seeking to reduce religion to a few fundamental propositions, free from the distortions of particular times and places, but the people flock to popular interpreters, largely unaware of the work of intellectual leaders. If these religious leaders continue to insist that only their own tradition contains fundamental truths, Yinger says we will find folk religion and religious substitutes performing the integrating function of the churches. The universalism of world religions is ready to declare that all men are brothers; but man's salvation depends on his acceptance of the particular religions own temporally and culturally bound revelations and traditions.

Social change begins with technology, with a population increase or decrease, with economic improvement or decline, with an increase of interaction with other societies, with the pronouncements of a prophet, or in other ways. Institutional arrangements that are taken for granted or thought of as independent are brought forcibly to attention, by rapid change as parts of a system. Religion is part of this complex system, with its developments best understood as responses to fundamental changes in their social environment which feed back into the system from which it came. The influences set in motion become, in turn, conditioning and constraining forces that affect the religion that released them. The development of religious sects and cults have appeared among groups caught in severe disprivilege, frequently being racial or cultural minorities who have been overrun by a more advanced or more powerful society. With their traditional way of life destroyed, belief in the old ways declines, values and desires are taken over from the invading force, yet full acceptance of the new way and its religion is neither possible nor permissible. The resulting religions that arise out of this context are alien from the perspectives of both the invading and the invaded cultures and often involve a strong emphasis on group conflict. These religious cults and sects have the potential to carry their members over into a new life, drastically readapting their personalities. The likelihood of these functions are not certainties, depending on the responses of the surrounding society. The phenomenon found in these cults are the product of attitudes of a culture torn between hatred of the people who had destroyed the old way of life and now dominated them by force, and the desire to obtain for themselves the possessions of their conquerors. But such malice toward the dominant society is not limited to conquered peoples. If, within a society, a group lacks an independent and successful past which can serve as the focus for its future, they can affirm that they are the true defenders of a tradition shared with their oppressors who have fallen into sinful ways. They are scarcely less critical of the existing institutions than a conquered people, attacking that society by downgrading its institutions and refusing to give it final loyalty. Even in a society where freedom of religion is the rule, there is little tolerance for those efforts to win salvation that involve direct attack on the social order and its dominant religious organizations. Almost universally, the response of those in power is suppression and curtailment of activities, making the movements relatively short-lived. But if the movement is suppressed while the basic forces that produced it remain in operation, the group will reappear in new guises time after time. Two kinds of religious groups may evolve from a revolutionary movement. If hope for restoration and independence fades, a more accommodative group will form, but if there is growth in hope, along with status improvement, the group that forms will orient toward that of the dominant members of society, with the sect to church transition likely taking place. Depending on the variables of hope and discipline, groups will differentiate into several types of religious activity, from gang membership to strictly disciplined militant and religious groups, representing the range of endeavor among disprivileged persons to wrest some dignity and meaning from life.

On the other end of the spectrum, many people in modern societies find themselves in relative comfort, with the changes affecting them quite different. With the reduction of illness, lengthening of life, an increase in mobility, more leisure time, increased education, and the extension of contact across cultures many people in these societies are concerned with loneliness in a sea of acquaintances, meaninglessness amidst conflicting values, self-alienation in context of contradictory role requirements, and tense interpersonal and intergroup relations. Two trends among these privileged members are a renewed interest in religion along side of secularization, and religious separatism in the context of ecumenicity. The decline of authentic religious content along with the rise of humanistic and nationalistic themes is usually a hidden process carried on underneath symbols of non-change. The churches of those who are comfortable in a society are usually well accommodated to that society, which does not necessarily denote secularism. The church works within the structure of the established social order, adjusting to dramatic changes in the world within which it works. We are in fact witnessing religious change, the development of new religious forms, which can be a sign of strength. The catastrophic wars of the last few generations, the vast cruelties of totalitarian governments, and the incredible threats of future war make it apparent that man has won no salvation from death, injustice or hostility. These developments support revival among the religious professionals, but these theologians seem less accustomed to dealing with the new crises of affluence, mobility, and anomie. The other aspect of religious separatism and ecumenicity is strongly affected by the social forces which continue to operate to preserve religious differentiation despite the reduction of some of the separating influences. While a few religious leaders engage in discussions concerned with the reduction of religious separation, many economic, political, and educational associations cut across religious lines, with interfaith marriages being the best index of the extent of separation or integration. The consequences for religion may reinforce ecumenicalism in the context of extensive growth of interfaith marriage. Because it is the marginal member who is most likely to intermarry, the ranks of the unchurched may swell, or could lead to new religious identities or conversions. Opposition to intermarriage is one way family and societal influence is widely assumed to promote ethnic-religious group continuation. Different classes, races, ethnic groups, and regions develop different religious values and structures, according to the variation in needs and experiences in a heterogeneous society. Although the ethnic lines which reinforced religious divisions may be fading, the religious lines of distinction remain clear. Future developments of ethnic-religious groups depend on the external situation in which the members find themselves. Yinger states that only after we have developed pluralistic patterns appropriate to the needs of modern societies can we create a system for the world, in which similarities are not coerced and differences do not divide.

Yinger concludes by saying that first physics and astronomy, then biology, and now sociology and psychology have brought into question some of the assumptions of a stable religious world-view. He observes that after centuries of presumed conflict, both science and religion continue to prosper. The religious forms that are developing in the context of science may not be meaningful and creative to some, with too much richness being lost or too much that has lost its significance being retained. But this much we know, claims Yinger, by the growth of knowledge, religion may be changed, but it will not be destroyed. The social sciences will modify contemporary religious expressions, but it cannot satisfy the needs from which religion springs. Yinger speculates that in a society where science has become a vital part of the world view of most people, either religious expressions in harmony with that fact will develop, or religious substitutes will prevail which would only marginally help us deal with the human condition. In dealing with the individual and group powers of the world, religion is working in a constantly more complicated situation. He proposes that in a world in which brotherhood has become an absolute necessity rather than an exciting vision, accepting forms of religious expression that had meaning a century or decade ago could be an utter failure.

His essays were quite convincing in some aspects, but I disagree with his assumption that accepting religious forms of the past can be seen as a failure. The faith that has been handed down to us by our forefathers is just as significant today as it was when it was first formed. The ways we express that faith may be different somewhat, but its inherent meaning will ultimately never change.

Luckmann's assumption, that individual existence and its relation to the social order is historical, produces the problem that individual existence in society has reached a critical point in the contemporary world. He maintains that the relevance of sociology for contemporary man derives primarily from its search for an understanding of the fate of the person in the structure of modern society. He states that in order for the sociologist's theory to be relevant to his fellow man, he must not fail to formulate it objectively and in a manner, which permits the inspection of evidence, which should be his most important aim.

The problem of individuality within society, according to Luckmann, can be unified in the sociological theory of religion, which he says, can be attributed to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. He states that both were interested in the fate of the individual in modern society and recognized that the character of society had serious consequences for the individual person. Their concern for the social conditions of the individual, he claims, clearly expresses the moral engagement of their sociological theorizing. Both Durkheim and Weber sought to understand the social position of the individual in the study of religion. For Durkheim, the symbolic reality of religion is the core of the collective conscience and its internalization by man makes him into a social and moral human being. For Weber, the social conditions of individualism is more specific in the historical context of particular religions and their relation to historical societies. Both Durkheim and Weber linked the problem of the individual in modern society directly to the secularization of the contemporary world. Both recognized this as a religious problem.

The sociology of religion consists of an increasing number of studies in the demography of churches, statistics of participation in church related activities, analyses of sectarian movements, monographs of ecclesiastic organizations, and various studies of religious beliefs. But according to Luckmann, finding theoretical significance amidst all these studies is disappointing. The new sociology of religion has neglected its most significant theoretical task, which is to analyze the changing social basis of religion in modern society. The answer to this problem may be found in the cumulative findings of investigations in areas such as industrial and occupational sociology, the family, mass communications, leisure, and those few studies in the sociology of religion which go beyond the scope of traditional church religion.

In the absence of an organized theory, Luckmann proposes that some assumptions have developed that perform the function of theory. The main assumption consists in the identification of religion with the church, which has the most important consequences for research and theory in the sociology of religion. Religion becomes a social fact either as institutionalized ritual or doctrinal ideas. The identification of religion with the church fits into sociology as the study of social institutions. The well known thesis, that religion is a primitive stage in the evolution of human reason and would eventually be replaced by science has contributed to the misunderstood assumption that secularization is measured by the decline of the churches. This view of secularization tends to be explained by transformations in other areas of the social system, such as urbanization and industrialization, which were believed to undermine traditional institutions such as the church. The assumption that church and religion are identical is accompanied by the idea that individual religiosity is based upon psychological needs which are both defined and met by the church.

Luckmann says, this is an inadequate system for understanding the relationship between the individual, religion, and society. He believes individual religiosity cannot be understood without reference to a given historical and institutional reality of ritual and belief. These assumptions are based upon an identification of religion with its institutionalized form; therefore, the discipline of sociology accepts the ideology of the churches as valid interpretations of the range of their subject matter. The new sociology of religion is exclusively concerned with church oriented religiosity, but has failed to continue the theoretical traditions of the classical sociology of religion. It fails to concern itself with the location of the individual in society, whose position is essentially religious.

Individual religiosity, Luckmann acknowledges, is shaped by a historical church, which forms a doctrine that is codified in sacred texts, which in turn are transmitted and interpreted by an official body of experts in a binding manner for the laymen. As an historical institution, the church also develops traditions rooted in the interests of these administrative elites. The individual is socialized into the official model of religion to the intent that it constitutes his system of ultimate significance, which is incorporated into a worldview. The internalized model retains its meaning in the life of the individual by integrating and legitimizing the norms of conduct that govern the routines and crises of his existence. This model is elaborated by the experts and its various dimensions become the subjects of specialized knowledge in the form of doctrine, liturgy, and social ethics which places an emphasis on faith, good works, or ritual correctness.

The internalization of the model formulates in the individual specific norms of conduct and belief, which in turn defines role requirements. Religion may be perceived by the individual as the fulfillment of the particular role requirements. The segregation of these norms from the world, Luckmann says, could weaken the integrating function of religious representations for everyday conduct if not countered by the pervasion of religion in society. The fulfillment of these requirements becomes highly routine, threatening the ultimate significance to the individual, although the sacred quality of the norms continues to be nominally recognized. The model may still be plausible enough to motivate the fulfillment of specific norms, but could decrease to the extent that the institutionalized requirements are no longer observed by the typical members of society, unless non-religious motives are substituted for them. Since the official model is interpreted by the experts, who may become oblivious to the typical routines and crises of the laymen, this poses a danger of separation in the views of the experts and the matters of ultimate significance for the laymen. This can be countered, though, by interpretive translations of the doctrines of the theologians into the language of the laymen by a body of pastoral specialists. Combined with distinct models of church oriented religiosity and the routinization of the fulfillment of specific religious norms, this separation of views can be an important factor in the genesis of secularization.

Institutional specialization of religion transforms the relation of the individual to the worldview and in turn to the social order in general. The church enters into relationships with other specialized institutions whose primary functions are secular. The relations of the church to political and economic institutions range from mutual support to accommodation to competition to open conflict. In contexts of these relationships, the church inevitably develops secular interests of its own in addition to its doctrinal and liturgical traditions. Economic, political, and administrative practices are designed, which compromise the original intents of the church in the understanding of those who take the specific religious claims of the church literally. If the official model is taken at face value, they may question the legitimacy of these operations. In transmitting the official model to the laity the religious experts must give sacred explanations for the secular activities of the church. This pluralistic situation threatens the stability of the model. Competing institutions vie for official status habitually claiming doctrinal superiority and a higher degree of purity from secular involvements. The history of sectarian movements in Christianity provides ample support for this observation, Luckmann states.

The doctrine of the visible and invisible church in Christian theology serves as an example of the divergence of the official model of religion with the socially predominant view of ultimate significance. Institutional specialization of religion which includes standardized transmission of the official model, a doctrinal cannon and controls against deviation, decisively reinforces its textual stability, which is one of the most important vested interests of the influential body of religious experts. Under conditions of rapid social change, perspectives of consecutive generations will inevitably differ causing a serious problem for the specialized religious models. Due to its textual and organizational limitations, the official model of religion predictably changes at a slower pace than the social conditions that modify the predominant individual view of ultimate significance.

Some individuals may continue to adhere to the claims of the official model, eliminating any secular inconsistencies, which can lead to an inability to perform nonreligious roles effectively, and to a form of martyrdom resulting in a partial withdrawal from the world, accompanied by tolerable compromises with the world. But the conflicting requirements of religion and the world stimulate the individual to reflect on possible solutions. In the leap of faith solution to the problems of life, individual religiosity is reconstituted after a phase of doubt. If a plausible solution is not found, the routine of the pre-reflective attitude will continue to be followed. Another possibility is the formation of a value system in which religious roles are performed for secular reasons or wholly abandoned. Luckmann claims that at various levels of reflection, the individual tends to restrict the relevance of religious norms to areas that are not anticipated by secular institutions, making religion in essence a private affair. The institutional specialization of religion increasingly transforms it into a private reality, in which the liberation of individual consciousness from the social structure and the freedom in the private sphere provide the basis for the sense of autonomy characterized by the typical person in modern society.

The consequences of specialization and the observations on the relation between the official model and individual religiosity prepare for the analysis of religion in modern society, which cannot honestly attribute the decline of Christianity's traditional forms to the advent of secularist ideologies. The decline of traditional Christianity, Luckmann believes may be symptoms of a more revolutionary change, which could implicate the replacement of institutionalized religion by a new social form of religion. Factors that cause a growing incongruence between the official model and individual religiosity, disrupting the identity of church and religion, are present in this social form of religion. With a sense of autonomy, the individual is more likely to confront the culture of religion as a consumer, choosing from the assortment of ultimate meanings as he sees fit. Through a certain level of subjective reflection and personal choice, he constructs both his personal identity and his individual system of ultimate significance. The autonomous consumer selects certain religious themes from the available assortment and builds them into a private system of ultimate significance, making individual religiosity no longer a replica of an official model. Church religiosity can be viewed as one manifestation of an emerging, institutionally non-specialized social form of religion, which continues to occupy a special place because of its historical connections to traditional Christianity. This social form of religion emerging in modern industrialized societies is characterized by the direct accessibility of an assortment of religious representations, which makes religion essentially a phenomenon of the private sphere. This implies that there is no obligatory model of religion, but that religious themes continue to be socially mediated in some form.

Luckmann speculates that religious themes originate in the private sphere, resting primarily on emotions and sentiments that are sufficiently unstable to make their articulation difficult. These highly subjective themes are not defined by primary public institutions, but can be taken up by secondary institutions such as advice columns, inspirational literature, and popular song lyrics, which expressly cater to the private needs of the autonomous consumer. The primary institutions regulate the legal and economic frame within which the competition of the ultimate significance market occurs. The selection is based on consumer preference, Luckmann states, which is determined by the social biography of the individual, while similar biographies will result in similar choices. The autonomous individual will not only select certain themes but will likely construct a well-articulated private system of ultimate significance. The prevalent individual systems will consist of an unstable hierarchy of opinions legitimizing the priorities determined in private life.

In the absence of external support by primary institutions, subjectively constructed religiosity with its diverse systems of ultimate significance will have an uncertain reality for the individual. While these systems are characterized by considerable variability in content, they are structurally similar and relatively flexible. These systems of individual religiosity are supported by other persons in the private sphere, partially sharing and jointly constructing their ultimate significance, with no apparent conflict with the norms of the primary institutions. Support for these subjective systems may come from family, friends, neighbors, and significant others who share in the construction and stabilization of private universes of ultimate significance, with family being the most important medium. If these private universes unite to some degree, the groups may assume sectarian qualities, developing the secondary institutions referred to earlier.

The character of religious institutions was radically transformed by their loss of monopoly in defining the sacred universe. They are forced to compete with many other sources of ultimate significance for the attention of autonomous individuals. Since they are recognized as religious and claim a connection to the Christian universe, they continue to enjoy a certain advantage in the open market. To the extent that traditional Christian conversation survives, Luckmann alleges that it provides a vocabulary that disguises some newly emerging themes. These themes are internalized in a significantly different manner in different social sections. The dominant themes in the modern sacred universe bestows an almost sacred status on the individual by articulating his autonomy, which is consistent with the finding that ultimate meaning is found by the typical individual in modern industrial societies primarily in the private sphere of his private biography. The traditional symbolic universes become increasingly irrelevant to the everyday experience of the typical individual and lose their character as a reality.

Luckmann states that man's individual autonomy represents the absence of external restraints and the traditional taboos in the private search for his identity. Since the inner man is an undefinable entity, its supposed discovery involves a lifelong quest. The individual embarks on a journey of self-realization and self-expression that is intermittent because it is immersed in the recurrent routines of everyday life. Since his conduct is controlled by the primary public institutions, he recognizes the limits of his autonomy and learns to confine his search to the private sphere. Luckmann concludes that the modern sacred universe symbolizes the social-historical phenomenon of individualism, which bestows ultimate significance on the structurally determined private sphere. The structure of the modern sacred universe and the theme of its content represent the emergence of a new social form of religion, which is determined by a radical transformation in the relationship of the individual to the social order.

The secularization of the church, therefore, is not simply a symptom of the modern industrialized society, but is in fact a metamorphosing of the church within the church. As the external church appears to be declining to the undisciplined eye, its members are in essence becoming a new creation within the cocoon of the traditional Christian Church. The autonomy of the individual is a necessary stage in the development of the true church, which will worship in spirit and in truth rather than in the ritualistic outward manifestations of the traditional church. The convictions by the Holy Spirit of the autonomic individual must take precedence over the traditional model of institutionalized practices and faith. As the metamorphosing completes its cycle, the true church will emerge in a social revolution that will change the world. The divisions between denominations will fall as Christians abandon the disguises that have so long kept us in the ritualistic garb of the cocoon, though it was necessary to protect us through the cold season of reformation. The invisible religion will emerge from its cocoon and feed on the sweet nectar of the Spirit, and rest safely in the hand of God until we fly to the heavens a new creature.

Cloud and Townsend believe that the Word of God tells us clearly what our boundaries are and how to protect them, as well as what is not within our borders of responsibility, but that our families, and other past relationships, confuse us about our property lines. “We are responsible to others and for ourselves.” Being responsible to others is doing what they cannot do for themselves. Being responsible for ourselves is carrying our own daily loads. It is when one's daily load is exceeded beyond what he is capable of carrying, that we should bear one another's burdens. Both those who cannot set boundaries for themselves and those who do not respect the limits of others have boundary problems. While we are not responsible for others feelings, attitudes, and behaviors, we do have responsibilities to each other. The inability to respond to others genuine needs is neglecting our responsibility to them. Cloud and Townsend purport that setting boundaries does not mean building walls. They propose that our boundaries need to be passable in order to allow good relationships in, yet strong enough to keep out danger.

Some examples of boundaries that Cloud and Townsend expound on are the physical body boundaries, verbal boundaries, truth boundaries, geographical distance, time management boundaries, emotional distance, other people's boundaries, and consequences of boundaries. “The most basic boundary-setting word is no.” Cloud and Townsend say the Bible is very clear about letting your yes be yes and your no be no. The word no lets others know that you are in control of yourself. Those who cannot say no to others demands passively comply, but are inwardly resentful much of the time. When we say yes, it should be a reflection of our love, not simply an expression of guilt or compulsion. Our physical self is our first and foremost boundary that separates us from others. Victims of early physical or sexual abuse often have trouble setting clear boundaries. Our verbal boundaries should clearly express who we are and who we are not to others. Honesty about who we are and who God is are truth boundaries. Distortions of this reality have disastrous consequences in our lives. If we live in the truth, we are much happier. Those who do not accept the truth of who they are and who God is, live outside of their own and God's boundaries. Living a lie is a sure path to destruction.

Cloud and Townsend suggest that “the concept of boundaries comes from the very nature of God.” God limits what he allows in His presence. “He confronts sin and allows consequences for behavior.” He guards his property and allows no evil to abide in his presence. He invites all who repent of their evil to come in, while closing the gates on those who do not. “We need to develop boundaries like God's.” Sometimes we must create geographical distance by physically removing ourselves from a situation in order to clarify and maintain boundaries. We must do this at times in order to replenish ourselves physically, emotionally, and spiritually just as Jesus often did. Other times we must remove ourselves from evil and dangerous situations. The Bible urges us to separate ourselves from those who continually hurt us in abusive relationships (Mathew18: 17,18; I Cor5: 9-13). Time apart often heals relationships, while leading those who suffer a loss of fellowship to repentance and a change of behavior. Cloud and Townsend show us that setting limits on others behavior is not really possible, but that we can limit our own exposure to people who behave poorly. God lets us behave as we choose, but He does not allow evil to come into His house. All are welcome, but only the repentant can enter in. “God limits his exposure to evil, unrepentant people, as should we,” purports Cloud and Townsend.

Cloud and Townsend truthfully state that our most basic need in life is relationship. We need to be able to both give and receive love. Many people withhold love from others and cannot accept it from others out of fear of relationship due to past hurts. The heart must be able to trust enough to feel safe enough to love. Fear of being alone keeps many of us in abusive relationships for years. God does not enable us to continue acting irresponsibly. The Bible sets consequences for certain behaviors. We reap what we sow. We must also back up our boundaries with consequences when others trespass against us. Threats must be followed through with when behaviors continue to violate in order to let people know the seriousness of the trespass and teach them to respect our boundaries.

Behaviors always have consequences because of God's law of sowing and reaping, but when someone interrupts the natural progression of this law, that person often reaps the consequence of the other person's deed. To rescue one from the natural consequences of his behavior only serves to enable him to continue in that pattern. Cloud and Townsend pose that parents often fall into this trap, but propose that “parenting with love and limits, with warmth and consequences, produces confident children who have a sense of control over their lives.” We need to take responsibility for our choices, which produces the fruit of self-control in our lives. Often we try to lay this at someone else's feet, thereby relinquishing control over our behavior to someone else and avoiding the responsibility of that behavior. But we must realize that we are in control and if we choose to live by the spirit, we will live; and if we choose to follow our sinful nature, we will die.

We are reluctant to set boundaries in various areas of our lives because setting them causes conflict, especially when we have neglected to do so before. Setting and maintaining boundaries teaches others to respect your needs and desires as well as their own. If you do not maintain your boundaries, you will inevitably be in bondage to others whims. People with no boundaries respond automatically to the anger of others by rescuing them, seeking their approval, or getting angry back at them. Good boundaries allow us to be separate enough to love others. You can use physical distance as well as other limits to enforce consequences for those who do not respect your boundaries. When boundaries are enforced, others are forced to use self-control rather than other-control. As long as their behavior controls you, they have no need for changing that behavior. God says he will only do what is right and that he will not participate in evil. So when people continue to go their own way, he lets them alone, and often that is just what we must do in our relationships. One should consider the consequences of setting boundaries and be willing to accept risk and sometimes loss of relationship.

Setting limits is the first step in a long process of gaining freedom from others controlling behaviors. When one is physically overpowered by a controlling person, often abusive behavior escalates. Sometimes we need outside help to enforce our limits. Remaining in an abusive relationship is not a required for forgiveness to take place. Forgiveness is the responsibility of the abused, but reconciliation is the responsibility of the abuser as well. We may not be reconciled to an abusive person if they refuse to change their behavior, though we can still forgive them. We can forgive others, while guarding our heart until we see “fruit in keeping with repentance.” They should produce the fruits of repentance, the evidence of change, before we are reconciled to them in relationship. God is reconciled to his people when they are truly repentant, just as we might be reconciled with a person who has shown himself repentant and trustworthy. Forgiveness is for past offenses, where reconciliation is about future behavior. When people deny responsibility for their own behavior, without really trying or seeking help to change their behavior, then we need not accept reconciliation at the expense of our personhood.

Dr. Henry Cloud and Dr. John Townsend's book on boundaries is one of the best self-help books I have read. The psychological perspectives of understanding differing personalities, helps you to see where you fit in to the relationships that may be controlling you and limiting your freedom and peace. Learning to have peace in your self and in your relationships is dependent on your ability to set appropriate boundaries on yourself and respecting the boundaries of others.